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 The conventional wisdom in the wake of Bush v. Gore1 was that 
the decision represented a significant departure from prior equal pro-
tection jurisprudence, and the contributions by Richard Briffault and 
Rick Hasen to this symposium provide confirmation of that view.2 I 
want to make two points in response to their fine essays. First, it is a 
mistake to try to fit Bush v. Gore into existing equal protection 
frameworks. As I explain in Part I, Bush v. Gore is best understood 
as a new type of equal protection claim. On one reading, it addresses 
broad structural concerns rather than conventional individual 
harms. 
 Second, I argue in Part II that the structural reading is probably 
unfounded.3 Bush v. Gore could, in theory, represent a sophisticated 
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 1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 2. See Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 325 (2001); Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law 
in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377 (2001). 
 3. There is, of course, a less generous reading of Bush v. Gore: it may be an exercise 
in naked partisanship. Plenty of academics have hashed out that question. See, e.g., Frank 
I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (2001); Richard A. Pos-
ner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon to an Assessment, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2001); David A. 
Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737 (2001); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757 (2001); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the 
Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (2001); Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, 
AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48; Ronald Dworkin, A Badly Flawed Election, N.Y. REV. 
OF BOOKS, Jan. 11, 2001, at 53, 53-55; Charles Fried, A Badly Flawed Election: An Ex-
change, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 22, 2001, at 8, 8-10; Neal Kumar Katyal, Politics Over 
Principle, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A35; Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Dec. 25, 2000, at 18, 18-21. I have little to add to that discussion. Moreover, even if one 
thinks Bush v. Gore involves bad faith decisionmaking, it is worth considering the doc-
trinal package in which the Court chose to wrap its decision, for that choice itself tells us 
something about the judicial culture. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Dis-
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effort to conceptualize democratic principles in structural terms. But 
it is far more likely that the Court, in announcing a new type of equal 
protection claim, is simply reverting to one of its bad habits in vot-
ing-rights cases: decisionmaking unmoored from an explicit norma-
tive theory. One of the great oddities in the Supreme Court’s voting-
rights jurisprudence dating back to the Warren Court is that the 
Justices often disavow the notion that they are importing a particu-
lar theory of democracy into the decision.4 Their claim to agnosticism 
is, of course, implausible. And the Court’s self-conscious preference 
for avoiding any discussion of its normative premises has led to the 
type of decisionmaking we see in the Bush v. Gore per curiam: an 
opinion that articulates the injury in an abstract, formal manner; 
announces a legal rule with no easily discernible limits; defines 
equality in mechanical, quantitative terms; and fails to address the 
hard normative issues embedded in the questions it resolves.5 The 
Court has, in effect, poured new wine (the novel claim recognized in 
Bush v. Gore) into the old bottle of past jurisprudential habits.6 
                                                                                                                    
order, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 696 (2001) (placing Bush within the context of “[the] judicial 
culture, . . . the empirical assumptions, historical interpretations, and normative ideals of 
democracy that seem to inform and influence the current constitutional law of democracy”). 
 4. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. As-
sembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). 
 5. Cass Sunstein has written extensively on the value of “incompletely theorized 
agreements,” and the benefits derived from the Court’s failure to explain and develop the 
broad theories underlying decisions rendered on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); 
Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996). I share Richard Fallon’s view that “incompletely theorized 
agreements” represent “a second-best approach.” RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING 
THE CONSTITUTION 106-07 (2001). Moreover, as I explain in greater detail elsewhere, even 
setting aside the benefits of transparency discussed by Fallon, supra, I believe that this 
strategy engenders more costs than benefits in the context of voting rights because of the 
difficult nature of the issues presented to the Court. In the voting context, the Court’s fail-
ure to articulate its normative premises leads it to mistake structural claims about the ag-
gregation of votes for conventional individual rights, a mistake that leads to circular de-
scriptions of the constitutional injury, doctrinal incoherence, and an inappropriate reliance 
on mechanical rules. See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Translation: Baker v. Carr and 
the Supreme Court’s Inability to Translate the Equality Norm in Voting Cases, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 15-25, on file with author). 
 6. In this sense, I join Pam Karlan and Rick Pildes in thinking of Bush v. Gore as a 
continuation of the Court’s prior jurisprudence, albeit for different reasons. See Pamela S. 
Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of The Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. 
Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345 (2001) [hereinafter Karlan, Nothing Personal] 
(arguing that Bush v. Gore resembles the Shaw line of cases in that it demonstrates the 
Supreme Court’s confidence in its own abilities, its distrust of other institutions for resolv-
ing voting controversies, its solicitousness toward those who do not require judicial protec-
tion, and its willingness to suspend traditional standing requirements); Pamela S. Karlan, 
The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE VOTE: 
BUSH V. GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT 77 (Richard Epstein & Cass Sustein eds., 2001) 
[hereinafter Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection] (same); Pildes, supra note 3, at 696-97 
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I.   NEW WINE: BUSH V. GORE’S NOVEL EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM 
 In trying to explain the new equal protection injury announced in 
Bush v. Gore, Hasen’s and Briffault’s papers neatly complement one 
another.7 Both struggle mightily to fit Bush v. Gore into conventional 
equal protection analysis, and both make interesting observations 
along the way. But it is the struggle itself that I find most intriguing, 
because it raises the question of whether we are making a mistake by 
trying to squeeze Bush v. Gore into the framework the courts have 
traditionally used to evaluate equal protection harms. 
 Hasen and Briffault, of course, do not seek to answer that ques-
tion here.8 They both take Bush v. Gore on its own terms. But the 
fact that neither of these able academics can offer a coherent theory 
for Bush v. Gore, let alone agree on its basic application, is worth not-
ing. It suggests that we may need to discard the frameworks we have 
used in the past to understand voting claims. 
 Specifically, the reason that Hasen and Briffault struggle so much 
here is that they are talking about a different category of harm. Be-
cause they analyze the case in conventional terms, they try to figure 
out why the conduct challenged in Bush v. Gore harms an individual 
or a group. But even if the Bush v. Gore majority suspected that Flor-
ida officials were reading ballots in a manner that undermined 
Bush’s chances of election, no one had solid proof of this bias. Be-
cause there was no evidence of a skew, intentional or otherwise, the 
right here is very different from traditional equal protection analy-
sis—it is the right to equality in the abstract.9 Hasen’s and Briffault’s 
                                                                                                                    
(arguing that Bush v. Gore reflects the Justices’ own views about democracy as strong or 
fragile, chaotic or robustly competitive). 
 7. The papers also complement each other in that both assess the implications of 
Bush v. Gore for the Court’s federalism theories. Hasen sees the Bush v. Gore claim as 
more intrusive on federalism values than prior doctrine because, in his view, the nuts and 
bolts of redistricting are more intuitively local concerns than what he terms the “claims of 
localities to deny the franchise to certain groups of individuals or to count votes unevenly.” 
Hasen, supra note 2, at 380. I disagree with him to some extent, but it may simply be a 
matter of how we frame the question. I understand those prior doctrines not as depriving 
the state of the right to disenfranchise or to count votes unfairly, but as depriving the state 
of the ability to choose how to structure its government and electoral system, which has 
also long been understood as an issue of local concern. Thus, in my view, the Baker and 
Shaw lines involve significant intrusion into local concerns. Briffault’s important contribu-
tion to this debate provides a further puzzle. He argues that the Court’s opposition to the 
use of a standard to count votes necessarily deprives local decisionmakers of the discretion 
one might think federalism would accord them. See Briffault, supra note 2, at 373-76. One 
leaves both pieces with a strong sense that “federalism” is so vaguely defined in the Court’s 
jurisprudence that it does not provide a meaningful principle for deciding cases. 
 8. Few things are more unforgivable than a person commenting on a paper who, in 
fact, talks about a prior question or fails to address the author on his own terms. All I can 
offer by way of apology is that academics usually commit this sin when the author has 
written something intelligent and persuasive, leaving little room for direct criticism. 
 9. I do not mean to say that Bush and his supporters had no means of asserting 
standing in this case. If one analogizes Bush v. Gore to Miranda, see infra text accompany-
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search for the elements of a Washington v. Davis claim, intent and ef-
fect, is therefore futile.10 That is why we need a new framework. The 
one the two authors employ cannot possibly work here because it is 
not geared to this type of injury. 
 So where do we look to find this new framework? One possible ex-
planation for the harm in Bush v. Gore, and its departure from tradi-
tional equal protection analysis, is that Bush v. Gore is really a struc-
tural claim.11 It is a claim about how to order a well-functioning de-
mocracy, not a suit about individual rights. In this sense, Bush v. 
Gore may resemble other claims that do not fit easily into a conven-
tional individual rights paradigm, like the right to an undiluted vote 
or the one-person, one-vote claims.12 To the extent that such claims 
implicate broad democratic structures, we should not be surprised 
that it is difficult to identify a conventional individual harm. 
 If structural concerns are the source of Bush v. Gore, then we need 
to think of the claim differently. Perhaps we should think of the 
cause of action as something akin to a due process claim, as Briffault 
notes in passing and as others have argued here and elsewhere.13 
Procedural due process claims may be structural in this sense; they 
address the way a system of adjudication is supposed to work rather 
than intentional injury or differences in substantive outcomes. That 
is why a violation of procedural due process can be established with-
                                                                                                                    
ing notes 18-19, then Bush may raise a claim on behalf of his supporters regarding the risk 
of hidden discrimination. Similarly, as Larry Tribe helpfully pointed out to me, Bush was 
the officially certified winner of Florida’s electoral votes at the time of the Supreme Court’s 
decision. Any decision that might call that position into question—even the order of a re-
count where Bush was as likely to emerge the winner as Gore—would represent a concrete 
injury to Bush and his supporters. Imagine, however, that this case had been brought be-
fore any candidate had been certified the winner. In this context, the underlying injury as-
serted by the voters—the right not to be subject to a recount process that involved no skew 
against any type of voter or candidate—is quite abstract when viewed against the tradi-
tional equal protection doctrine. It is in this conception of the harm that I discuss here. 
 10. 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976). 
 11. See Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 78 (concluding that 
Bush v. Gore involves a structural principle designed “to regulate the institutional ar-
rangements within which politics is conducted”); see generally Samuel Issacharoff & Rich-
ard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 643 (1998) (proposing a structural analysis of voting-rights cases). 
 12. I have briefly explored these questions elsewhere. See Heather K. Gerken, Under-
standing the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1665, 1727 (2001) [hereinafter 
Undiluted Vote]; Gerken, supra note 5 (manuscript at 25-52). One key difference between 
the harm recognized in Bush v. Gore and the dilution injury is that in dilution cases, it is 
possible to identify a discrete group of individuals who have suffered a concrete injury. 
Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra, at 1724-25. The same cannot be said of the Bush v. Gore in-
jury, which seems to fall equally upon all voters. See infra text accompanying note 30. 
 13. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 2, at 343; Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as 
the Legislature Thereof May Direct”: The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 613, 615 (2001); Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Un-
dermined the Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535, 
550-52 (2001). 
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out proof that a different result would have obtained had the treat-
ment been nonarbitrary.14 
 If we still need to identify a source of individual harm, then per-
haps we should look to an expressive harm theory.15 It may be that 
the arbitrary and capricious treatment of ballots the Justices per-
ceived in Florida conveys an improper message about the value of 
one’s vote. If so, we might still care about the differential treatment 
of like ballots even if the conduct does not stem from an improper 
motive or result in a skew. For example, we might think a healthy, 
well-functioning democracy demands that voters have confidence in 
the sanctity of the ballots they cast, which in turn requires that state 
officials accord adequate respect to those ballots by treating similarly 
situated ballots alike.16 In the words of the per curiam, the recount 
process violated equal protection because it was “not well calculated 
to sustain the confidence that all citizens must have in the outcome 
of elections.”17 
 Alternatively we could envision Bush v. Gore as a prophylactic 
rule, like Miranda,18 or as an effects test in discrimination cases. As-
                                                                                                                    
 14. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978). 
 15. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of 
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Deborah Hellman, The 
Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 13-14, 34-35 (2000); Ellen 
D. Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. REV. 491, 512-17 
(2000); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and 
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 483 (1993); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expres-
sive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998). In a recent e-mail ex-
change, Larry Tribe raised yet a third possibility: that the constitutive aspects of voting 
might serve as the source of the harm. See E-mail from Larry Tribe, Professor of Law, 
Harvard Law School, to Ellen Katz, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan 
Law School (May 26, 2001, 14:45:50 EST) (on file with author); see also Katz, supra, at 491; 
Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: 
Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 453-57 (1989). 
 16. I do not mean to suggest here that the ballots in question were similarly situated, 
just that the Court thought of them as such. After all, they were the products of quite dif-
ferent voting procedures and machines. See Laurence H. Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and Its Dis-
guises: Freeing Bush v. Gore From Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 177 (2001); 
see also Karlan, Nothing Personal, supra note 6, at 1364-65. Another bad habit of the 
Court’s jurisprudence is its failure to pay adequate attention to the factual context of its 
decisions. See Heather K. Gerken, Morgan Kousser’s Noble Dream, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1298 
(2001) (reviewing J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INSURANCE: MINORITY VOTING 
RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999)). 
 17. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109, (2000). 
 18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A concern about the possibility that a 
broad recount standard would facilitate sub rosa discrimination has been raised by Einer 
Elhauge in a recent article, see Einer Elhauge, The Lessons of Florida 2000, 111 POL’Y REV. 
15, 18-27 (2001-02), and in an amicus brief he and Charles Fried filed in Bush v. Gore, see 
Brief of the Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Neither Party and Seeking Reversal, Bush v. Gore, No. 00-949, 2000 WL 1868121. 
For an argument that Shaw can also be understood as a prophylactic rule, see Melissa L. 
Saunders, Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting, 109 YALE L.J. 
1603, 1605-07 (2000). 
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suming that discrimination in the counting process is hard to detect, 
we might be especially concerned about the possibility of discrimina-
tion in the classic sense (an intentional effort to skew the count in fa-
vor of a particular candidate) when dealing with recounts governed 
by a flexible standard. After all, in contrast to rules adopted ex ante 
(or even variations in machinery that existed ex ante), at the point of 
a recount we may know what outcome will result from a more or less 
generous approach to determining the voter’s intent.19 Thus, we could 
read Bush v. Gore’s demand for uniformity as embedding within the 
structure of the electoral process a prophylactic protection against 
invidious discrimination. 
 There is one final possibility to play with. We could read Bush v. 
Gore as a reflection of the Court’s efforts to vindicate a structural 
concern of a different sort: the value of “stability and measured 
change,” to borrow Justice O’Connor’s phrase.20 As Richard Pildes 
has recently observed, Bush v. Gore may reflect the Justices’ strongly 
held assumptions about democracy, whether they view the rough-
and-tumble political process as threatening chaos or healthy democ-
ratic competition.21 The Court has often expressed concern about de-
stabilizing threats to the two-party system: blanket primaries,22 fu-
sion candidates,23 party raiding,24 and the like. In Bush v. Gore, the 
threat to stability may have been polarization—the fear that the dis-
orderly recount process was exacerbating political divisions. In this 
sense, the danger the Court perceived in Bush v. Gore may have re-
sembled the “exacerbat[ion of] . . . racial bloc voting” the Court feared 
in Shaw v. Reno,25 the “divisive sore-loser candidacies” it sought to 
avert in Burdick v. Takushi,26 or the “destabilizing effects of 
                                                                                                                    
 19. Such an intuition may also help explain our collective concern over whether the 
Florida Supreme Court had changed the rules of the game midstream, a concern that may 
have animated Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence to Bush v. Gore as well. In offering 
this hypothetical justification for Bush v. Gore, I do not mean to make too much of the ex 
ante/ex post distinction, as the line is too often difficult to draw. Here, for example, at the 
time of the litigation both the Bush team and the Gore team were guessing as to which 
standard would most benefit their candidate, and neither guess appears to have been ter-
ribly accurate. See, e.g., Dan Keating & John Mintz, From Election Audit, Most Uncer-
tainty; Miami Herald Review Shows Result Hinges on Standard Used in Recount, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 5, 2001, at A15. I am grateful to Larry Tribe for raising this point. 
 20. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring). I am in-
debted to Lani Guinier for suggesting this point. See also Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, 
THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 
ch. 6, at 18-19 (forthcoming Feb. 2002) (manuscript on file with author). 
 21. Pildes, supra note 3, at 704-05.  
 22. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577-78 (2000).   
 23. See, e.g., Timmons v Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366-67 (1997). 
 24. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992). 
 25. 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993). 
 26. 504 U.S. at 439. But see Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 
227 (1989) (no state interest in avoiding “intraparty friction”). 
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party-splintering and excessive factionalism” it tried to avoid in 
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party.27 
 The problem for the members of the Bush v. Gore majority, how-
ever, is that there was no easy doctrinal path for vindicating this 
concern. In cases like Burdick and Timmons, it has been quite easy 
for the Court to express its preference for stability-promoting democ-
ratic structures through the balancing test the Court uses to evalu-
ate First Amendment claims; the Court could simply place a judicial 
thumb on the scale in favor of the state’s interest in stability.28 Bush 
v. Gore, however, presented the Court with the same dilemma it 
faced in Shaw: it was the actions of the state itself that threatened to 
factionalize the electorate.29 This may help explain the abstractness 
of the injury articulated in both Bush v. Gore and Shaw.30 Because 
the legal claim at stake did not allow for the inclusion of the value of 
stability in the doctrinal equation, this concern may have seeped into 
the definition of the injury itself. On this view, the polarizing and 
chaotic recount process was the source of the harm in Bush. Because 
such a harm is what Justice Frankfurter would call “a wrong suf-
fered by [the state] as a polity,”31 it is not surprising that the injury 
seems abstract and amorphous when viewed through the traditional 
lens of Article III standing. 
II.   OLD BOTTLES: THE COURT’S BAD HABITS  
IN VOTING-RIGHTS CASES 
 There is a second possible explanation for Bush v. Gore, one that 
is a more likely candidate for explaining the decision. While it may 
be tempting to think of the Bush v. Gore claim as a structural harm, 
the Court has not yet explicitly accepted scholars’ invitation to think 
of democracy in structural terms, and the opinion itself offers no hint 
that it is taking a structural view.32 Thus, while Bush v. Gore may 
                                                                                                                    
 27. 520 U.S. at 367. 
 28. See, e.g., id.; Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439.  
 29. In Shaw, the Department of Justice may also have been an instability-inducing 
culprit in the Court’s eyes, as it often intervened in the redistricting process during the 
1990s to promote its policy of “maximization.” This may explain why the Department of 
Justice was so frequently and harshly rebuked by the Court. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 
U.S. 899, 912-13 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 907-08, 921-23 (1995). 
 30. See Karlan, Nothing Personal, supra note 6, at 1349-53, 1357-63 (arguing that 
Shaw and Bush v. Gore both involve attenuated injuries that are not sufficiently concrete 
to confer standing); Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection, supra note 6, at 20-21. 
 31. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946). 
 32. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (discussing injury in terms of 
individual right to vote), with Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t, 528 U.S. 377, 401 (2000) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (suggesting that campaign finance doctrine should be recast as a principle 
“to protect the integrity of the electoral process—the means through which a free society 
democratically translates political speech into concrete governmental action”), and Laur-
ence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the 
Future—Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110 (1999) (discussing 
414  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:407 
 
have announced a new type of injury, it is best viewed as exemplify-
ing a common problem in voting cases dating back to the days of the 
Warren Court: formalist reasoning unmoored from an explicit nor-
mative theory. The same tendency emerges in cases involving one 
person, one vote; vote dilution; and Shaw. This Part explores the 
weaknesses that result from the Court’s avoidance of normative de-
bate and argues that Bush v. Gore provides a good example of these 
problems. This Part concludes by speculating about why the Su-
preme Court is so uncomfortable with making normative pro-
nouncements about democracy. 
A.   Judicial Agnosticism 
 Members of every generation of the Supreme Court’s Justices 
have claimed that they have no theory about the way democracy 
should work.33 It is an odd claim for many reasons. First, it seems 
strange that a group constantly making rules about how the game is 
played should admit that they have no view on why we play it and 
who should win. 
 Second, the claim of agnosticism is implausible. Whenever the 
Court inserts itself into the democratic process, it is making a judg-
ment about how that process should work. One person, one vote pre-
sumably embodies a theory about majoritarianism;34 vote dilution 
doctrine tells us something about the power that should be accorded 
to electoral minorities;35 the right-to-vote cases incorporate a judg-
ment about representation, participation, and community member-
ship.36 The Supreme Court similarly makes a decision about democ-
ratic values when it declines to act. The political question doctrine is 
a theory about how our constitutional system should work;37 Justice 
                                                                                                                    
structural approach of federalism cases and relating to questions of individual rights), and 
Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1601 (2000) (documenting and analyzing the structural approach adopted by the 
Court in its recent federalism decisions). 
 33. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that courts should not recognize a harm that requires them to “resort to political theory 
[in order to] determine which electoral systems provide the ‘fairest’ levels of representation 
or the most ‘effective’ or ‘undiluted’ vote[ ]”); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 
377 U.S. 713, 748 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion because 
“it imports and forever freezes one theory of political thought into our Constitution”); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (warning against 
courts “choos[ing] among . . . competing theories of political philosophy”); see also Einer El-
hauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83 (1997) (critiquing Court for 
failure to consider democratic theory in term limits decision). 
 34. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 545-56 (1964). 
 35. See Lani Guinier, [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 109, 124 (1994). 
 36. See Michelman, supra note 15, at 443. 
 37. See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 650-55 
(2001). 
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Thomas’s insistence that dilution claims are noncognizable impli-
cates a particular understanding about the aggregative aspects of 
voting.38 
 Even when the Court does not self-consciously eschew normative 
theory, it often fails to articulate the normative premises of its deci-
sions or offers them cloaked in such vague generalities as to be inde-
cipherable. In Bush v. Gore, for example, the per curiam opinion 
stated that one source of the right at issue “lies in the equal weight 
accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter,”39 a 
phrase highly reminiscent of the Warren Court’s suggestion that the 
mere failure to achieve exact population equality in districts some-
how renders each person “that much less a citizen.”40 While the 
words have a lovely ring to them, it is hard to describe the injuries in 
question, let alone explain why those injuries rise to constitutional 
status. The same is true of the early vote-dilution cases handed down 
by the Burger Court.41 While these decisions are often filled with 
stirring language about the right to vote, it is difficult to identify 
their precise doctrinal or normative parameters. 
B.   Agnosticism’s Effects 
 The problem is not just that the Court claims to be agnostic while 
it continues to worship at various altars of democratic theory. The 
problem is that the Court’s purported agnosticism allows it to in-
dulge in a number of bad habits in voting cases, all of which are read-
ily identifiable in Bush v. Gore.  
1.   The Right is Defined in Abstract Terms  
 First, when the Court fails to articulate the normative premises of 
its decision, it tends to describe the injury in abstract terms.42 Con-
sider, for example, the one person, one vote cases. These cases were 
originally fashioned as equal protection claims based on the assump-
                                                                                                                    
 38. See Guinier, supra note 35, at 122-23. 
 39. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S 98, 104 (2000). 
 40. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964). 
 41. Compare Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533, and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), with 
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
 42. I should emphasize that when I argue that the right is defined in abstract terms, I 
do not mean to suggest that the doctrine itself lacks concrete, real-world consequences. To 
the contrary, as Richard Fallon has reminded me, one of the odd things about Bush and 
many other voting cases is that the Court relies on an abstractly defined right to justify in-
serting itself into the nitty-gritty details of redistricting. See Gerken, supra note 5 (manu-
script at 2). What is missing in these cases—what makes the right seem abstract despite 
its real-world effects—is a principle for translating the broad equality norms on which the 
Court relies into a sensible definition of the right it is vindicating. For a detailed analysis 
of the problem of translation theories in voting cases, see id. 
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tion that rural voters had different interests than urban residents.43 
And the Court’s early articulation of the one person, one vote princi-
ple might have developed into a sufficiently robust theory of democ-
ratic representation to take that truth into account.44 Instead, the 
Court simply stopped talking about which voters were affected by the 
skewed districting system. It similarly abandoned any effort to ex-
plain why the disparities in question demanded judicial intervention 
or to offer a theory of representation that required equally populated 
districts. Without a normative theory to define the parameters of the 
constitutional harm, the Court’s description of the injury became cir-
cular: population deviations cause an injury because they depart 
from the principle of one person, one vote. In short, the description of 
the harm was transformed into its normative justification.45 
 The same seems true of Bush v. Gore. Without a normative theory 
for why minor variations in recount efforts matter, it is difficult to 
say anything meaningful about the injury. For example, if Bush v. 
Gore had invoked a theory of aggregation, we could define the injury 
as the arbitrary treatment of votes that affects the election outcome. 
We would know to look for the skew that Briffault and Hasen search 
for in the opinion, and we would recognize that randomly distributed 
errors are constitutionally acceptable. If the Court had instead in-
voked an expressive harm theory, we would have to decide whether 
human error matters more or less than machine error for purposes of 
measuring the expressive injury. That analysis would, in turn, help 
us decide whether minor variations in a recount process are accept-
able when remedying more significant disparities in machine counts. 
If the Court had adopted a prophylactic rule, we would know that 
variations in machinery are not constitutionally problematic, but 
that uniformity would be demanded of any ex post decisionmaking. 
As the opinion stands, however, we cannot describe the right in suffi-
ciently concrete terms to resolve these questions. 
2.   The Absence of Limiting Principles 
 This brings me to a second parallel between Bush v. Gore and past 
voting-rights jurisprudence. In the absence of a theory like one of 
those identified in Part I, it is very difficult to figure out the limiting 
principle for an abstractly defined right like the one articulated in 
                                                                                                                    
 43. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 273 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting complaint as 
challenging discrimination against a “geographical class of persons”). 
 44. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 563 n.40, 565-66 (asserting that the Constitution man-
dated the “full and effective participation” of citizens within the democratic process, guar-
anteed “fair and effective representation” to them, and forbade efforts to undermine citi-
zens’ voting power “by any method or means”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) 
(describing one person, one vote principle as fostering equal representation). 
 45. For a more detailed analysis of these problems, see Gerken, supra note 5.  
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Bush v. Gore, as Hasen’s and Briffault’s papers demonstrate.46 Under 
traditional equal protection analysis, it is hard to understand why we 
should care about a minute percentage of ballots being treated differ-
ently as long as there is not an outcome-affecting skew. But the odd 
result in Bush v. Gore seems a natural outgrowth of the Court’s 
vague and abstract approach. 
 Consider again what happened in the one person, one vote cases.47 
On one view, population equality represents a means to an important 
end, a well-functioning majoritarian system. But without an expla-
nation as to why equality in population was necessary to achieve this 
important democratic value or whether that principle should always 
trump others, population equality became an end unto itself. 
 Because equal population became the definition of the harm 
rather than the means to measure or prevent it, no limiting principle 
existed for discerning when variations from population equality 
would be acceptable. At least at the federal level, absolute numerical 
equality became the standard for measuring the constitutional harm 
in these cases, and it became difficult to argue that the one-person, 
one-vote rule should be suspended when necessary to achieve the 
broader democratic aims that (one presumes) the rule was originally 
designed to serve. One could not, for instance, argue that some popu-
lation disparities should be tolerated in order to implement other 
values that promoted the same goal of a well-functioning majori-
tarian system (for example, keeping communities of interest intact in 
order to facilitate better representation, or providing a forum for 
electoral minorities to obtain an adequate voice).48 The Court’s failure 
to articulate its normative premises in the one person, one vote cases 
has thus led to the type of formalism we do not often associate with 
the Warren Court;49 it has become a jurisprudence where the rule is 
all that matters.50 
3.   The Prevalence of Bright-Line Rules and Mechanical Proxies  
 The third problem that arises from the Court’s reluctance to ar-
ticulate its normative premises is a marked trend toward using 
bright-line rules and mechanical proxies. Such tests can, of course, 
provide an efficient and sensible means to achieve a broader, norma-
                                                                                                                    
 46. See Briffault, supra note 2; Hasen, supra note 2.  
 47. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 533; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 1; Baker, 369 U.S. at 
186.  
 48. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
 49. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court: Rediscovering the Link Between Law 
and Culture, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 456 (1988) (praising the Warren Court for avoiding 
formalist judging). 
 50. For a more detailed analysis of these problems, see Gerken, supra note 5 (manu-
script at 21-25).  
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tive agenda. The problem in the voting context, however, is that too 
often courts lose track of the normative foundations of the rules and 
proxies they have adopted. Again, the test becomes all that matters, 
and courts rigidly, often unthinkingly, apply it in contexts where it 
does not fit. 
 As I have discussed elsewhere,51 section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act52 provides a good example of this problem. Section 2 prohibits 
vote dilution by preventing states from taking advantage of racially 
polarized voting among whites and racial minorities by drawing dis-
trict lines so as to deprive minority voters of a fair share of political 
power. The qualitative approach to assessing dilution claims offered 
by the Supreme Court53 and endorsed by Congress in 198254 all but 
demanded that courts make some normative judgments. To assess a 
dilution claim, they had to examine the dynamics of the election 
process and assess the quality of representation minority group 
members received. 
 The courts, however, have gradually moved away from this quali-
tative analysis toward a more rigid, quantitative approach for assess-
ing dilution claims. To begin, in 1986 the Supreme Court adopted the 
three Gingles preconditions,55 mechanical proxies for assessing 
whether racial minorities’ potential voting strength has been under-
mined. Many thought that the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson 
                                                                                                                    
 51. Gerken, supra note 16, at 1303-04. 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 53. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
 54. Congress endorsed a number of qualitative factors for assessing vote dilution in 
the Senate report accompanying the 1982 amendments. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 23 
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat. 131) 177, 200-01. Termed “the Senate fac-
tors,” they were pulled from a variety of dilution cases arising prior to 1982. See, e.g., 
White, 412 U.S. at 755; Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff’d sub nom. 
E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam). The factors in-
clude:  
the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; 
the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is 
racially polarized; the extent to which the State or political subdivision has 
used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for 
discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election dis-
tricts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; the 
exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; 
the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimi-
nation in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their 
ability to participate effectively in the political process; the use of overt or sub-
tle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which members of 
the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.  
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-45 (1986).  
 55. According to Gingles, plaintiffs must prove that (1) the state could have drawn an 
additional, compact majority-minority district but failed to do so; (2) the minority group is 
politically “cohesive”—that is, its members vote in a similar fashion; and (3) the white elec-
torate votes as a bloc, thus enabling whites usually to defeat the minority group’s preferred 
candidates at the polls. 478 U.S. at 50-51. 
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v. DeGrandy56 would revive the role of qualitative, contextual analy-
sis in the dilution context. Although the Court specifically reminded 
courts to pay attention to the qualitative concerns endorsed by Con-
gress in 1982,57 it offered a new standard for evaluating dilution—the 
proportionality standard—that was equally amenable to unthinking, 
mechanical implementation. Proportionality requires that members 
of a racial group have a chance to exercise electoral control in a num-
ber of districts roughly proportional to their share of the population.58 
It is an easily applied mathematical standard that requires a court to 
count the number of districts group members are capable of control-
ling on election day.59 Courts have quickly seized upon proportional-
ity as the preeminent measure of vote dilution60 and often apply it in 
a rigid way. In Barnett v. City of Chicago,61 for example, the Seventh 
Circuit assumed that section 2 demanded precise mathematical 
equality for all racial groups and hinted that proportionality may 
even serve as a ceiling upon the number of majority-minority dis-
tricts a locality can create.62 
 As the Gingles test and DeGrandy’s proportionality test take on a 
momentum of their own, as these numerical proxies become equated 
with democratic equality rather than measures of it, we can discern 
the potential costs to this approach. To begin, in adjudicating section 
2 cases, courts may end up neglecting other important aspects of our 
democracy. For example, if all that matters is proportionality, courts 
will think that dilution claims deal solely with what happens on elec-
tion day.63 They will thus ignore other important aspects of the de-
                                                                                                                    
 56. 512 U.S. 997 (1994). 
 57. Id. at 1011-12. 
 58. It is worth emphasizing that the proportionality standard does not suggest that 
only African Americans can represent African Americans and only Latinos can represent 
Latinos, nor does it guarantee a win to minority voters whether or not they show up to 
vote. To the contrary, in DeGrandy, the Court explicitly rejected the view that courts 
should look to election outcomes, specifically, how many minority legislators are elected in 
a district, in order to assess whether the districting scheme is “fair.” Id. at 1014 n.11. The 
Court was unwilling to assume that racial minorities can be represented only by other ra-
cial minorities, and it similarly refused to grant racial minorities a guaranteed right to 
electoral success. Id. Thus, DeGrandy held that fairness should be measured against the 
potential voting power of a minority group, that is, whether group members are capable of 
electing a candidate of choice (whatever the race of that candidate) if they choose to do so. 
In the words of the Court, “the ultimate right of § 2 is equality of opportunity, not a guar-
antee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates of whatever race.” Id.  
 59. Id. at 1013-14 (announcing the proportionality standard). 
 60. See, e.g., African Am. Voting Rights Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 54 F.3d 1345, 
1356 (8th Cir. 1995); Rural W. Tenn. African-Am. Affairs Council v. McWherter, 877 F. 
Supp. 1096, 1100-03 (W.D. Tenn. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Rural W. Tenn. African-Am. Affairs 
Council v. Sundquist, 516 U.S. 801 (1995). 
 61. 141 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 62. Id. at 703-05.  
 63. See Kathryn Abrams, Relationships of Representation in Voting Rights Act Juris-
prudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1993); see also Kathryn Abrams, “Raising Politics 
Up”: Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. 
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mocratic process (for example, the amount of political power minority 
groups enjoy once they have elected a candidate of choice to the legis-
lature or the quality of representation they receive).64 Courts will also 
be far less open to other types of voting concerns, for example, influ-
ence-district claims65 or other models of representation.66 After all, 
the proportionality standard, standing alone, offers no means for as-
sessing whether the interests of racial minorities are better served by 
majority-minority districts that concentrate their voting power or 
districting plans that spread their influence across many districts 
but do not grant them political independence in any single district. 
That judgment necessarily requires a normative theory for identify-
ing what constitutes the interest of a racial minority and a theory of 
representation.67 Further, courts may apply rough proxies and me-
chanical tests even when the normative theory behind those rules 
would counsel a different result.68 
 The question is whether Bush v. Gore will continue this trend.69 
Initially, for the reasons Hasen provides in his analysis of the costs of 
extending Bush v. Gore, I had thought that the Court would never 
pursue this line of reasoning because it would involve significant in-
trusion upon state decisionmakers carrying out traditional state du-
ties. Now I am not so sure.70 It may be that judicial intrusion into 
                                                                                                                    
REV. 449, 455-56 (1988); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic 
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 186-87, 
198 (1989); Judith Reed, Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the Racial Districting Cases as a 
Window on the Supreme Court’s View of the Right to Vote, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 389, 441, 
450 (1999). Pamela Karlan has argued that the Supreme Court has adopted an unduly 
narrow definition of equality in the Shaw case as well, focusing on the “claims of individual 
voters to the exclusion of claims about race-conscious districting’s contributions to the 
achievement of effective political equality for minority communities.” Karlan, Nothing Per-
sonal, supra note 6, at 1364. 
 64. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 510 (1992) (rejecting 
third-generation governance claim regarding the allocation of political power within local 
governing body). 
 65. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993) (rejecting influence-district 
claim). 
 66. See, e.g., Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 1998) (declining to 
adopt a cumulative voting scheme as remedy for vote dilution). 
 67. Gerken, supra note 16, at 1312-13.  
 68. The same problems seem to plague the Court’s jurisprudence under section 5, 
where the retrogression standard has been applied in a similarly rigid fashion. See, e.g., 
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 
U.S. 471 (1997).  
 69. To be fair, I suppose that if Bush v. Gore is indeed intended as a prophylactic rule 
guarding against intentional discrimination, there is a stronger reason for the bright-line 
rule to be given such prominence. A prophylactic rule remains a means to an end (deter-
ring discrimination), but it cannot function effectively as such if judges constantly return 
to its normative underpinnings and engage in a case-by-case contextual analysis to root 
out discrimination; they must apply the rule in something akin to the unthinking fashion I 
have criticized above. 
 70. My confidence has been undermined in part because of the questions both pieces 
raised about whether the Court is serious about federalism issues in this context. If Shaw 
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state affairs is less likely to deter the Court than the absence of eas-
ily applied mechanical standards. After all, the latter allow the Court 
to think it is avoiding, often incorrectly, assessments about individ-
ual substantive preferences or broad structural judgments about rep-
resentation and the democratic process. Thus, it may be that the 
Court was willing to restructure virtually every state redistricting 
scheme on equal protection grounds precisely because the one per-
son, one vote cases were eventually reduced to what Justice Stewart 
termed “sixth-grade arithmetic.”71 We may find in the future that 
courts are more willing to strike down state redistricting plans if sec-
tion 2 liability becomes nothing more than a mechanical application 
of Gingles and a rigid adherence to proportionality. 
 If this hypothesis proves accurate, then the Bush v. Gore injury is 
just the kind of claim that the Court is likely to develop. The injury is 
easy to quantify, and it does not appear (at least superficially) to re-
quire endorsement of a particular theory of democracy or representa-
tion. Absolute equality among counting mechanisms will become an 
end unto itself, and we will never have a theory explaining why this 
type of democratic equality matters, save a few Kennedyesque 
phrases about equal treatment.  
 That is also why I think that Hasen’s cautious hope that Bush v. 
Gore might lead to development of new principles in the context of 
campaign finance and vote aggregation rules is misplaced.72 For the 
Court to venture down that road, it would have to adopt a thicker 
normative theory about representation and the democratic process, 
and this Court seems to lack the judicial imagination to do so. 
4.   The Court’s Failure to Come to Grips With the Normative 
Stakes of the Questions Before It 
 This leads me to my fourth and final concern about the Court’s 
agnosticism regarding democratic theory: the Court should not avoid 
these inquiries. The reasons for this trend are easy to explain and 
sympathize with—these questions are hard. For example, qualitative 
assessments of dilution claims would require courts to make judg-
ments about the interests of minority voters, the quality of represen-
tation they receive, and the allocation of political power among 
groups. The one-person, one-vote cases demand an assessment of 
what constitutes effective representation and how to balance the dic-
tates of majoritarianism against the interests of distinct minorities. 
It is understandable that judges prefer to latch on to a mechanical 
                                                                                                                    
and the one-person, one-vote cases provide any indication of this Court’s proclivities, the 
level of intrusion is unlikely to bother the Court. 
 71. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964).  
 72. Hasen, supra note 2, 402-05. 
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proxy or a thinly defined injury and thereby avoid, or more accu-
rately, think they are avoiding, these difficult judgments.73 
 We know, however, that the Court is necessarily making such 
judgments and it should therefore face them squarely in doing so. 
Consider, for example, Hunt v. Cromartie,74 the Court’s latest itera-
tion of Shaw. In the early days of the Shaw doctrine, Shaw was all 
norms and no empirics.75 The doctrine centered upon a normative as-
sessment of the role race should play in politics, which led to a spir-
ited debate among the Justices that filled hundreds of pages in the 
U.S. Reports. 
 It is striking how easily the Court was able to set aside those 
normative debates in Cromartie. Both the majority and the dissent 
are formal and mechanical. Each takes an agreed-upon set of facts, 
applies the same standard, and reaches different conclusions.76 And 
both opinions are bereft of any sense of the broader issues at stake. 
They debate whether registration rates accurately reflect political af-
filiation, whether a given precinct contained more Democrats than 
African Americans, and whether particular legislative statements 
signaled a racial motive.77 But the two opinions do not wrestle with 
the normative questions embedded in the controversy. This is the ju-
risprudence of the technocrat: mechanical, seemingly neutral adjudi-
cation that conceals, but does not eliminate, the normative theories 
that necessarily undergird the decision. 
 The same may prove true of Bush v. Gore. The Court seems to be 
vindicating a principle of equality, but it is equality of an extraordi-
narily narrow sort. In mandating the equal treatment of ballots that 
appear identical, the Court simply ignores the deep, systemic ine-
qualities that plague our democratic process. For example, as 
Spencer Overton discusses in this symposium, the poor and racial 
minorities in Florida may have been less likely to have their ballots 
counted under any recount standard due to disparities in electoral 
resources;78 thus, as Larry Tribe has noted, straining ballots 
“through a uniformly metered sieve will [still] yield an unequal 
stream of results.”79 The Court’s failure to wrestle with these ques-
tions—what does equality mean, and how far should we go to attain 
                                                                                                                    
 73. For a more in-depth analysis of the reasons behind the Court’s agnosticism, see 
Gerken, supra note 5 (manuscript at 25-52).  
 74. 121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001). 
 75. See Gerken, supra note 16, at 1317-18. 
 76. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. at 1466, 1475. 
 77. Id. at 1459-65, 1474-75.  
 78. Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Race, 29 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 469-71 (2001). Recently released studies by various media consor-
tia reveal that this issue is more complex than previously suspected. See, e.g., Ford Fes-
senden & John Broder, Examining the Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A1. 
 79. Tribe, supra note 16, at 256. 
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it when the twin problems of race and poverty permeate our democ-
ratic structures?—gives an unwarranted patina of legitimacy to the 
election system. 
 Nor does the Court address the normative questions necessarily 
implicated by the more limited injury it recognizes. For example, if 
the injury at stake is an expressive harm, how do we decide whether 
such a harm exists? Should the Court consult its own intuitions? 
Public opinion polls?80 Similarly, how would the Court respond to 
Richard Briffault’s argument that the source of the injury in Bush v. 
Gore, the grant of discretion to local decisionmakers, is federalism it-
self?81 How should we weigh the concrete costs of judicial intrusion 
Hasen has documented against the equal protection values the Court 
seeks to vindicate?82 What do we make of the contested and contest-
able assumptions about the locus of democratic decisionmaking 
Spencer Overton has identified in the Court’s preference for a rule 
over a standard?83 
 I do not mean to suggest that every court must engage in norma-
tive hand-wringing each time it renders an opinion or that we should 
abandon bright-line rules. Nonetheless, we should expect, or at least 
hope for, some recognition of the normative stakes in the opinions 
judges render and a concomitant willingness to reexamine those 
normative premises where appropriate. That is especially true 
where, as here, the Court is announcing a newly minted voting claim 
in a highly charged political environment. If the Court decides to rec-
ognize a right that does not fit easily within conventional equal pro-
tection doctrine, it should provide a normative map so we can tell 
where we are heading within this political thicket. The unfortunate 
fact is that explicit normative engagement has not always been evi-
dent in voting-rights decisions dating back to the Warren Court, and 
there is little hope that it will be forthcoming should Bush v. Gore 
spawn progeny of its own. 
                                                                                                                    
 80. If so, then the problem of butterfly ballots and overseas voters should have con-
cerned the Court more than the claim Bush raised. As my British research assistant ob-
served, people seemed far more upset about “elderly Holocaust survivors voting for Bu-
chanan” or “our boys in uniform, fighting for our rights on foreign soil, being denied the 
right to vote” than the differences in the standards used to count ballots. 
 81. Briffault, supra note 2, at 375.  
 82. Hasen, supra note 2, at 399-402.  
 83. See Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Recounts: Form and the Law of De-
mocracy, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 16-18, on file with 
author). 
